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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 78-2-2(3)0 (1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1. A governmental entity and its contractor owe a duty to protect one
motorist from the negligent or reckless acts of another motorist? R. 516-26.
2. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment to Ball, Ball &
Brosamer because there was no evidence that the plans and specifications were so
obviously dangerous that no reasonable contractor would follow them? R. 52632.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Utah Supreme Court has set forth the standard
of review of a summary judgment as follows:
Inasmuch as a challenge to summary judgment presents for review
conclusions of law only, because, by definition, summary judgments
do not resolve factual issues, this court reviews those conclusions for
correctness, without according deference to the trial court's legal
conclusions. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988).
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989).

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
There are no controlling statutory provisions with respect to the claims
brought by the Trujillos against Ball, Ball & Brosamer.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This case arises out of an automobile accident which occurred on
September 24, 1995, as the Trujillos were traveling eastbound on Interstate 84 in
Weber Canyon. Scott Griffin was traveling westbound on the same roadway
when he lost control of his vehicle, crossed the center line, and collided with the
Trujillos and a barrier installed to guard traffic from the work area. Subsequent
investigation by the Utah Highway Patrol revealed that Mr. Griffin was driving
under the influence of alcohol and that his blood alcohol level was .27, or over
three times the legal limit in Utah.
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On October 15, 1996, the Trujillos filed suit against the Utah Department
of Transportation ("UDOT") and Ball, Ball & Brosamer contending that these

2

entities had a duty to protect them from the negligent, intoxicated and reckless
driving of Mr. Griffin. R. 1. Specifically, they alleged that these parties should
have installed a portable concrete barrier between the lanes of traffic which
allegedly would have prevented Mr. Griffin from entering their lane of traffic.
R.4.
On November 12, 1997, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson granted
summary judgment in favor of both UDOT and Ball, Ball & Brosamer. The basis
for summary judgment for UDOT was that "the decision made in planning and
designing the 1-84 resurfacing project, which included a Traffic Control Plan
utilizing barrels to separate the two-way, two-lane operation ('TLTWO') was a
discretionary act which created immunity for UDOT under the discretionary
function exception to the Governmental Immunity Act, pursuant to UTAH CODE
ANN. § 63-30-10(1)." R. 1034.
The basis for granting summary judgment in favor of Ball, Ball &
Brosamer was that "in carrying out the plans and specifications for 1-84 as
drafted by UDOT, it, as the contractor, acted in accordance with the plans and
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specifications which were not so unreasonably dangerous that a reasonable
contractor would not perform or carry out said plans and specifications." R.
1034.
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. This action arises out of an automobile accident which occurred on
September 24, 1995, on 1-84 near Morgan, Utah.
2. During 1995 and 1996, the Utah Department of Transportation
contracted with Ball, Ball & Brosamer to reconstruct a twelve mile portion of I84.
3. Although 1-84 typically has two lanes of traffic in each direction,
separated by a grassy median, to facilitate the construction, the plans and
specifications called for both lanes of traffic to be diverted onto one side. In other
words, during 1995, the two lanes typically used for west-bound traffic were
divided to accommodate both east and west-bound traffic, thereby permitting the
normal east-bound lanes to be re-constructed. This configuration is characterized
as Two-Lane, Two-Way Operations (TLTWO).
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4. The plans and specifications provided for separating the two lanes with
orange barrels at 100 foot intervals. Another option, which is the subject of this
litigation, was to use concrete barriers to divide the lanes of traffic.
5. As noted by the Trujillos, Utah has adopted the Manual of Uniform
Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD). The MUTCD states as follows with respect
to the use of two-way, two-lane operations through a construction zone:
When traffic control must be maintained on one roadway of a
normally divided highway, opposing traffic shall be separated either
with portable barriers (concrete safety-shape or approved alternate),
or with channelizing devices throughout the length of the two-way
operation. The use of striping, raised pavement markers, and
complementary signing, either alone or in combination is not
considered acceptable for separation purposes.
(R. 442)(emphasis added).
6. The Trujillos' own expert witness, Mr. Thomas Alcorn, testified that the
MUTCD does not require the use of barrier in two-way, two-lane operations, but
rather requires an engineering judgment regarding the appropriate means of
separating traffic:
Q.

That doesn't mandate that barriers are used in order to
comply with the MUTCD, does it?
5

A.
Q.

A.

This does not mandate it, no.
In other words, it's left up to the discretion of the
designer and the other officials who are actually
designing the project?
Taking into consideration the other requirements in the
manual, traffic study be performed and that they take
into consideration speed, volume, duration, or length of
project, exposure to hazards and existing rates or
features of the site. So if they take all that into
consideration with the language, then they are working
with the manual.

R. 2288. (Deposition of Thomas Alcorn, p. 103, attached as Exhibit "1").
7. In fact, Mr. Alcorn testified that, in his professional opinion, the use of
barrels was appropriate through much of the project, but that barriers should have
been installed between mileposts 107 and 109 because of a high accident rate
prior to inception of the project:
Q.

A.

Q.

Number three, UDOT failed to provide positive barrier
through sections with overrespresented accident rates to
prevent head-on collisions. Have you already stated you
opinion with respect to that?
Yes, I just want to make clear that I'm not saying that
you need barrier from one end of this project to the
other, that there are sections that should have been
looked at with high accident rates that need barrier.
Any sections besides 107 through 109?

6

A.

Not from the data that I have. One section, there wasyou have two other horizontal curves that have a
problem, but I didn't convert those to mileposts, so I
can't tell you exactly where they are at.

R. 2282. (Deposition of Thomas Alcorn, p. 97, attached as Exhibit "l"). 1
8. Bruce Swenson, the Region One Design Engineer for UDOT, testified
that he and the design engineer, Jim Thompson, considered the use of barrels and
barriers and ruled out the use of concrete barriers for several reasons:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Why did Jim want to use barrels instead of barriers?
Probably several reasons.
Can you tell me?
Cost would be one. Barrier is a dangerous object in and of
itself. It has a tendency to roll small vehicles particularly.
Jim was just as astute as anyone about watching out for the
little guy, you might say. Because the little haunch that comes
up on those barriers, they're called a Jersey barrier, and a
small vehicle gets up on them and, poof, it's right over on its
top.

'In their Statement of Fact No. 10, the Trujillos contend that "traffic engineering
standards, including the MUTCD, required that concrete barriers be installed to separate traffic
between mileposts 107 and 109." The referenced portions of the record relate to testimony by
Mr. Alcorn where he stated that he would have installed barriers between mileposts 107 and 109
based on his evaluation of the relevant factors. To the extent the Trujillos' Statement of Fact
suggests that there is a blanket requirement to use barrier at any location, it is inconsistent both
the plain language of the MUTCD and the testimony of Mr. Alcorn. As set forth in the MUTCD
quotation and Mr. Alcorn's testimony stated above, the MUTCD does not require that barrier be
used at any location.
7

* * *

Q.
A.

What other reason?
I remember talking about emergency vehicles. You can't just
leap a barrier with emergency vehicles. If you do have to
chase them around, you have to chase them clear up and
around an interchange.

R. 1824-26. (Deposition of Bruce Swenson, pp. 19-21, attached as Exhibit "2").
9. Mr. Alcorn also testified that barriers pose a risk of harm to motorists in
and of themselves:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

(By Mr. Morgan) In your opinion, do concrete barriers
constitute a hazard in and of themselves?
Yes.
Why is that?
They are rigid objets. The criteria for the use of barrier is
very clear, you only use a barrier when the hazard of hitting
the barrier is less than the hazard of hitting the object that the
barrier is protecting.

R. 2288-89. (Deposition of Thomas Alcorn, pp. 113-14, attached as Exhibit

10. Ball, Ball & Brosamer's project superintendent, Shankar Narayanan,
also testified that placing a barrier between the two lanes may result in increased
rear-end accidents:
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Q.

A.
Q.

A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Mr. Ferguson had you identify the benefits of concrete
barriers, and you also talked about one of the risks as~I
believe is being rear end, multiple rear end accidents, is
that correct?
Yes.
If you have concrete barriers such as have been
suggested by Mr. Ferguson, if you had those on the 1-84
project, would that cut down the availability of escape
on any side in order to avoid a rear-end accident for
eastbound traffic if there would have been channeled
concrete barriers on both sides?
You cut down-possibly cut down the access to the~for
people trying to maneuver out in front, moving across
into the other lane.
So, you cut down any escape routes whatsoever to either
side?
Eastbound?
By eastbound?
Yes.
That creates a risk in and of itself, correct?
That creates a risk, too, yes.

R. 1767. (Deposition of Shankar Narayanan, p. 103, attached as Exhibit "3").
11. Prior to letting the project for bid, the Utah Department of
Transportation entered into an extensive design and review process. Bruce
Swenson described the process, which begins with a scoping meeting where
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UDOT "kind of outlines the types of things we're going to do on the project." R.
1910. (Deposition of Bruce Swenson, p. 105, attached as Exhibit "2").
12. The scoping meeting is attended by several engineers for UDOT,
including safety engineers. R. 1911-12. (Deposition of Bruce Swenson, pp. 10607, attached as Exhibit "2").
13. The plans are then drawn and there is a "plan in hand" meeting
involving the same engineers. R. 1912-13. (Deposition of Bruce Swenson, pp.
107-08, attached as Exhibit "2").
14. The plan in hand meeting is followed by a "PS&E" meeting during
which each page of the plans and specifications are reviewed by between five and
twelve engineers. R. 1913-14. (Deposition of Bruce Swenson, pp. 108-09,
attached as Exhibit "2").
15. There is then a final review by each of the engineers on the project.
R. 1915. (Deposition of Bruce Swenson, p. 110, attached as Exhibit "2").
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16. During each of these levels of review, the Federal Highway
Administration participates in the review. R. 2044. (Deposition of David
Kennison, p. 99).
17. After Ball, Ball & Brosamer was awarded the contract and work
commenced, Shanker Narayanan became concerned that the 100 foot spacing of
the barrels, given the speed of traffic, raised the potential for cross-over
accidents. On May 25, 1995, Mr. Narayanan wrote a letter to Larry Durrant,
the project engineer for UDOT, stating:
This letter is to reiterate our concerns with respect to UDOT's less
than adequate traffic control design for this project. In particular, we
feel that the use of drums at 100' spacing to delineate opposing
traffic in an Interstate highway is hazardous to the traveling public
resulting in increasing the chances of accidents.
R. 568. (See Letter dated May 25, 1995, attached as Exhibit "4").
18. Mr. Durrant sent a return letter stating that Ball, Ball & Brosamer
should submit a substitute proposal attempting to correct the alleged dangers. R.
569. (See Letter dated May 30, 1995, attached as Exhibit "5").
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19. Mont Smith, the Safety Risk Manager for Region One, has testified
that absent "horrendous statistics," UDOT would not have reevaluated its
decision to use barrels instead of concrete barriers:
Q.

What, if anything, would have caused UDOT to switch from
barrels to barriers on 1-84?
* * *

THE WITNESS: I don't believe it is obviously a concern, the safety
of the highway condition, the user interpretation. I don't believe
anything short of horrendous statistics would have got another look
at that.
R. 2168-69. (Deposition of Mont Smith, pp. 97-98, attached as Exhibit "6").
20. Bruce Swenson has also testified that due to the hazards associated with
using concrete barriers, he would not have approved the use of concrete barriers
and that is the reason why barrels were used instead of barriers:
Q.

A.

Had the contractor suggested in this particular project that the
two-way traffic be separated with concrete barriers as opposed
to barrels or drums, would UDOT have changed to concrete
barriers throughout the project?
No.

R. 1923. (Deposition of Bruce Swenson, p. 118, attached as Exhibit "2").
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21. On September 24, 1995, the Trujillos were traveling heading eastbound on 1-84 and traveling at about 45 to 50 miles per hour. R. 581. (Deposition
of Alan Trujillo, p. 43, attached as Exhibit "7").
22. At the same time, Scott Griffin was driving west-bound on 1-84. It was
later determined that Mr. Griffin, who died in the accident, had a blood alcohol
content at the time of the accident of .27, which is three and one-half times the
legal limit. R. 576. (See Police Report, attached as Exhibit "8").
23. It was also later determined that Mr. Griffin was traveling at 58 miles
per hour at the time of the accident. R. 583. (Deposition of Michael Loveland,
p. 28, attached as Exhibit "9").
24. Shortly before the accident, Mr. Griffin lost control of his vehicle,
crossed the median, and smashed into the concrete barrier separating the travel
lanes from the work area. He was killed instantly. The Trujillos were heading
east-bound on 1-84 when Mr. Griffin smashed into the concrete barrier. They, in
turn, struck Mr. Griffin's vehicle and were injured. R. 576.
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25. In this case, the Trujillos retained Thomas Alcorn as an expert witness
to testify as to problems on the project which led to this accident. Mr. Alcorn set
forth his opinions on Exhibit 72, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "10":
1.
UDOT did not prepare a traffic control plan for the project
that took into consideration site/hwy characteristics or that complied
with national standard.
Speed
Volume
Duration
Exposure to hazard
Accident history
Geometries ~ horiz & vert curvature
2.
UDOT failed to reduce speed in accordance with regulations
for two lane highways and/or site features.
3.
UDOT failed to provide positive barrier through sections with
overrepresented accident rates to prevent head on collisions.
4.
UDOT [3Bs] failed to conduct or utilize recommendations and
project information to make necessary modifications to traffic
control.
R. 584.
26. Mr. Alcorn was unable to determine whether speed contributed to Mr.
Griffin's loss of control prior to the accident:
Q.

Do you know whether or not that loss of control was due to
speed or some other factor such as intoxication, fatigue or
inattentiveness?
14

A.
Q.

I can't tell you how many factors were in it, no.
You have no way to really determine what caused the truck
driver to veer off to the right?
BY MR. FERGUSON: Truck driver?
Q.
(By Mr. Williams) The pickup driver, Mr. Griffin.
A.
No, I don't.
R. 2269. (Deposition of Thomas Alcorn, p. 84, attached as Exhibit "1").
27. When Mr. Alcorn originally wrote out his opinions, he did not include
Ball, Ball & Brosamer in his criticisms. However, after conversing with the
Trujillos' counsel, he added Ball, Ball & Brosamer only to Opinion No. 4.:
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.

Calling your attention to Exhibit 72, you were asked to during
a break write down your opinions that you were going to
express in this case; is that correct?
Yes.
And you had about how long to write down those
opinions during the break?
I believe I took 10 or 15 minutes.
And having written down those opinions, then you were asked
questions with regards to them once the deposition
commenced; is that correct?
Yes, sir.
When you first wrote down your opinions on Exhibit 72,
before you were asked a question, am I correct that on opinion
number four, the slash and Three Bees was not there when
you first wrote it down?
You're correct.
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Q.

Once you were asked questions, when you were reading
number four, your counsel turned over to you and briefly
conversed with you, and you added Three Bees; is that
correct?

A.

That's correct.

R. 2293. (Deposition of Thomas Alcorn, p. 108, attached as Exhibit "1").
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I. UDOT and Ball, Ball & Brosamer's duty is limited to providing a
roadway reasonably safe for travel, and neither UDOT nor Ball, Ball &
Brosamer have a duty to protect one motorist from the negligent or reckless
conduct of another motorist. In this case, the Trujillos have not shown that there
was a defect in the roadway which rendered it unsafe for travel by a motorist
exercising reasonable care. Although the Trujillos contend that the 65 mile per
hour speed limit and "under designed" corners may have led to the accident,
even their own expert witness concluded that he was unable to determine why
Mr. Griffin lost control of his vehicle.
Applying the "special relationship" reasoning adopted by the Utah
Supreme Court, UDOT and Ball, Ball & Brosamer do not have a duty to protect
16
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ARGUMENT
I.
BALL, BALL & BROSAMER HAD NO DUTY TO
IMPLEMENT TRAFFIC CONTROL DEVICES TO PROTECT
THE TRUJILLOS FROM THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF
SCOTT GRIFFIN.
Ball, Ball & Brosamer respectfully contends that it fulfilled any legal duty
to the Trujillos and cannot be held liable for this unfortunate accident. As set
forth below, the Trujillos cannot demonstrate that there was a defect in the
roadway which rendered the road unreasonably safe for travel or a defect which
was a proximate cause of the accident. Rather, the Trujillos contend that this
Court should impose a duty upon both UDOT and Ball, Ball & Brosamer to
install barriers or other traffic control devices to protect them from the negligent
or reckless driving of Scott Griffin. Ball, Ball & Brosamer contends that
imposition of such a duty would be impossible to fulfill and should not be
adopted.2
2

This argument was raised before the trial court as part of Ball, Ball & Brosamer's
motion for summary judgment. R. 526. However, it was not relied upon by the trial court in
entering summary judgment in favor of UDOT and Ball, Ball & Brosamer. The argument is
presented here since the Utah Supreme Court has held that it "may affirm a grant of summary
18
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Since the Trujillos contend that Ball, Ball & Brovtmet. us a contractor performing work
in the construction zone, had the same duty as the Department n! Iransportation to protect them
from the acts of Mr. Griffin, we refer to cases on this subnet. :IIO-,I n-' -•v1v-u d ^ ' <• -'h ' .»HK
made against governmental entities.

19

40 C.J.S., Highways, § 258. See, also, Pickering v. State of Hawaii, 557 P.2d
125 (Ha. 1976); Merritt v. City of Chester, 496 A.2d 1220 (Pa. Super. 1985);
Helton v. Knox County, 922 S.W.2d 877 (Tenn. 1996); Ruff v. County of King,
887 P.2d 886 (Wash. 1995).
In each of the cases decided by the Utah Supreme Court, the plaintiff had
alleged some defect in the design or maintenance of the roadway itself, or in the
manner in which traffic was warned of hazards, which was a proximate cause of
the accident and resulting damages. For example, in Bramel v. Utah State Road
Comm'n, 465 P.2d 534 (Utah 1970), the plaintiff contended that the Road
Commission was negligent for failing to install appropriate signs warning of an
abrupt turn in the roadway and, as a consequence, he lost control of his vehicle
and was injured. In Carroll v. State Road Comm'n, 496 P.2d 888 (Utah 1972),
the plaintiffs were injured when their vehicle plunged into a wash across an
abandoned state road and the State failed to warn that the roadway was
abandoned and not suitable for travel. Id. at 889-90.
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Alcorn, was unable to determine why Mr. Griffin lost control of his vehicle and
swerved into the opposing lane of traffic:
Q.

A.
Q.

Q.
A.

Do you know whether or not that loss of control was
due to speed or some other factor such as intoxication,
fatigue or inattentiveness?
I can't tell you how many factors were in it, no.
You have no way to really determine what caused the
truck driver to veer off to the left?
MR. FERGUSON: Truck driver?
(By Mr. Williams) The pickup truck driver, Mr.
Griffin.
No, I don't.

R. 2269. (Deposition of Thomas Alcorn, p. 84). Although the Trujillos claim
that Mr. Griffin's speed was a proximate cause of the accident, Mr. Alcorn was
unable to determine whether speed was a factor in the accident:
Q.

A.

Q.
A.

In fact, you would merely be speculating, wouldn't you,
at this point that speed was one of the factors that
caused him to drive off the shoulder in the road prior to
the accident occurring?
A little more than speculation. It's very characteristic on
our highways throughout the country as a causal factor
in single vehicle, run-off-the-road accidents on the
outside of a curve.
But you're making a general statement, correct?
Yes.
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lauic

to negotiate the roadway at the posted speed limit, or that any alleged defect was
in fact a proximate cause of this accident. Thus, because UDOT and Ball, Ball &
Brosamer provided a roadway which was reasonably safe for travel, it fulfilled its
duty to the Trujillos and the traveling public and summary judgment was
appropriately granted.
B. UDOT AND BALL, BALL & BROSAMER HAVE NO DUTY TO
PROTECT ONE MOTORIST FROM THE RECKLESS ACTS OF
ANOTHER MOTORIST.
Unable to show that a specific defect in the roadway was a proximate cause
of the accident, the Trujillos contend that the duty imposed upon UDOT and Ball,
Ball, & Brosamer should be expanded to include a duty to protect one motorist
from the negligent or reckless acts of another motorist if the acts or negligence
can be deemed "foreseeable." Specifically, they argue that because it was
"foreseeable" that a cross-over collision could occur in the construction zone,
UDOT and Ball, Ball & Brosamer should have installed portable concrete
barriers to protect the Trujillos from the negligent, reckless, and intoxicated acts
of Mr. Griffin. Ball, Ball & Brosamer respectfully contends that it has no duty to
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Jersey, 571 A.2d 1329 (N.J.Super.A.D. 1990). For example, m Daniel, the New
Jersey Court of Appeals held as follows:
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i

by providing roads that are reasonably safe for their objectively
intended use.
Daniel, 571 A.2d at 1342.
Although the Utah Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of whether
a governmental entity and its contractors have a duty to protect citizens from
negligent acts of other motorists, the analysis applied in other circumstances
where a party claims another owes a duty of protection from the acts of third
parties is helpful. The Utah Supreme Court has generally followed the "special
relationship" reasoning of Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 314-320 (1965):
We acknowledge the general applicability in Utah of the "special
relation" analysis described in sections 314 through 320 of the
Restatement of Torts. See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts
§§ 314-320 (1965). A brief review of that concept will assist in
understanding our disposition of plaintiffs' claim under section 319.
Section 315 sets out the general tort principle that one has no duty to
control the conduct of third persons. The Restatement then lists two
exceptions to this general rule. First, if "a special relation exists
between the actor and the third person," then the actor has a duty to
"control the third person's conduct." Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 315 (1965). Second, if "a special relation exists between the
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careful consideration of the consequences for the parties and society
at large. If the duty is realistically incapable of performance, or if it
is fundamentally at odds with the parties' relationship, we should be
loath to term that relationship "special" and to impose a resulting
"duty," for it is meaningless to speak of "special relationships" and
"duties" in the abstract. These terms are only labels which the legal
system applies to defined situations to indicate that certain rights and
obligations flow from them; they are "an expression of the sum total
of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that a
particular plaintiff is entitled to protection." W. Prosser, Law of
Torts, 333 (3d ed. 1964), quoted in Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d
135, 138 (3d Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 446 U.S. 909, 100 S.Ct.
1836, 64L.Ed.2d261 (1980).
Id. at 718.
Ball, Ball & Brosamer contends that requiring UDOT and its contractors to
protect motorists from "foreseeable" accidents caused solely by the negligence of
other motorists is a duty realistically incapable of performance. The cost of
eliminating all "foreseeable" automobile accidents, to the extent such a noble
goal would be possible, would impose a crushing burden on UDOT and the
taxpayers of the State of Utah.
There is simply no feasible, cost effective means of eliminating cross-over
collisions. A cross-over collision is possible and, indeed, "foreseeable" at every
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protection from the hazards posed by an intoxicated driver who has lost control of
wfiicle.
A cross-over collision is possible and indeed "foreseeable" at any location
where an intoxicated driver may roam. Indeed, the Traffic Control Plans
developed by UDOT for the 1-84 project provided an added measure of safety not
fourd oh most Utah roads where two-way, two lane traffic is the norm—barrels
were placed between the traffic lanes to remind motorists to remain in their
traffic lane i :cquirc UI.)() 1 and its contractors t<> plaic a concietc bai i icr
down the miaatc 1 even highway, i n iaul nul nmitilinilinnil Micci in Hn
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State to protect against a "foreseeable" cross-over collision is a duty simply
incapable of performance.
Another obstacle to implementation of a broad duty to protect one motorist
from the negligence of other motorists is the sheer impossibility of designing
guards which would prevent all "foreseeable" accidents. As set forth in the
Statement of Facts, Bruce Swenson, the Region On Design Engineer for UDOT,
has testified that barrier also poses a danger to small vehicles and eliminates the
ability of emergency personnel to reach an accident scene. R. 5 The Trujillos own
expert witness, Thomas Alcorn, also acknowledged that barriers pose a danger.
R. 2288-89. (Deposition of Thomas Alcorn, pp. 113-14). Shankar Narayanan
also testified that placing barrier down the middle of the roadway would force
east-bound traffic to drive between two barriers, thus raising the risk of a rear-

5

Indeed, had UDOT used concrete barriers between the lanes of traffic, the Trujillos
would have been tunneled between two barriers-one on the right to protect against collisions with
worksite objects, and a second on the left to protect against westbound traffic. If an intoxicated
motorist such as Mr. Griffin had been traveling eastbound under these circumstances, and lost
control of his vehicle, other eastbound motorists such as the Trujillos may have been unable to
avoid a collision with the disabled vehicle. Under such circumstances, the plaintiff would argue
that UDOT and Ball, Ball & Brosamer knew or should have know that such an accident was
"foreseeable" and took steps to avoid it.
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The accident involving Linda Thomas highlights the dangers of focusing on one single
type of accident. The Court may recall from the Trujillos^ Statement of Facts that Mi Thon..i>
was involved in an accident some six weeks prior to the Trujillos at cident in which siie lost
control over her vehicle and crossed the median after she drifted to 'he side of the road and <. >• r
corrected (there was no barrier on the right side of traffic in that location). The Trujilios dv
-n
the similarity of that accident with their own, I lowever, they fail ^ acknow ledge that if UD< >T
and Ball, Ball & Brosamer had adopted their proposed solution and installed barrier between ihe
two lanes of traffic at milepost 107, Ms. Thomas and her 14-year-oid daughter would not h;r. ,'
crossed the median, narrowly missed a truck, and walked away from the accident. Rather. .:. would have slammed into the barrier proposed by the Trujillos and their expert witness, and
likely suffered either serious injury or been killed like Mr. Griffin. While it may seem so simple
to the Trujillos to place a barrier down the middle of the roadway to protect them from Mr.
Griffin, they, unlike UDOT and Ball, Ball & Brosamer, need not consider the fact that such a
decision would consign Linda Thomas, her daughter, and any other person over correcting alter a
minor deviation from, the roadway to probable death
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Rather, UDOT and Ball, Ball & Brosamer must consider whether
implementing one means of separating traffic will cause other types of accidents
and injuries, and whether in the event of an accident, emergency personnel would
be able to reach the site. In fact, in their entire 97-page memorandum before the
trial court, and their brief before the Utah Supreme Court, neither the Trujillos
nor their expert witness, Thomas Alcorn, have ever presented any solution to the
problem of preventing cross-over collisions without creating hazards and causing
other "foreseeable" accidents.
Other jurisdictions which have faced this issue have likewise concluded
that neither a governmental entity nor its contractor owe a duty to protect
motorists from the reckless or negligent conduct of other motorists. Klein v. City
of Seattle, 705 P.2d 806 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985); Diegel v. City of West Fargo,
546 N.W.2d 367 (N.D. 1996); Merritt v. City of Chester, 496 A.2d 1220
(Pa.Super. 1985); Ruff v. County of King, 887 P.2d 886 (Wash. 1995)(en banc);
Warda v. State, 256 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (Ct.Cl. N.Y. 1964); Church of Jesus Christ
ofLatter.Day Saints v. Superior Court, 714 P.2d 431 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985);
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Washington Couii oi Appeals stated as follows:
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Id. at 807-08. The Warda case referred to by the Washington Court of Appeals
also involved a head-on collision. There, the decedents were driving south when
a north bound vehicle "jumped the median" and collided with them. Warda, 256
N.Y.S.2d at 1008. The plaintiffs claimed that the State was negligent for not
installing barriers which would prevent such a cross-over accident. The Court
declined to do so, concluding that "to impose an obligation of guarding against
the gross negligence of an operator of a vehicle is not within the purview of the
decisions of this State." Id. at 1010.
InDiegel v. City of West Fargo, 546 N.W.2d 367 (N.D.1996), two
motorists approached a railroad crossing which was raised such that oncoming
vehicles could not see each other prior to the crossing. A head-on collision
ensured . In affirming summary judgment for the governmental entity, the North
Dakota Supreme Court stated:
Driving an automobile on any road or street presents some degree of
inherent danger. Our decisions, however, do not require a
municipality to be an insurer against accidents on streets. Rather,
the foregoing cases illustrate the resolution of a municipality's duty
involves whether the condition of the street is unreasonably
dangerous for a driver exercising ordinary care.
34

Id. at 372.
The Trujillos focus on the fact that a cross-over collision was admitted to
be "foreseeable" in the two-way, two-lane operations (as it is on virtually all
other roadways). In Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Services, 667 P. 2d 49
(Utah 1983), the Utah Supeme Court stressed that foreseeability is only one
factor be considered when determining whether a duty exists:
"Whether the law imposes a duty does not depend upon
foreseeability alone. The likelihood of injury, the magnitude of the
burden of guarding against it and the consequences of placing that
burden upon defendant must also be taken into account."
Id. (quoting Lance v. Senior, 224 M.E. 231 (111. 1967). In DiBenedetto v. Flora
Township, 605 N.E.2d 571 (111. 1992), the Supreme Court of Illinois stated:
Foreseeability is but one of the factors to be weighed in determining
the existence of a duty. Even if an accident is foreseeable, the
resulting burdens and consequences must also be considered before a
legal duty will be recognized. While this accident was foreseeable to
the extent that, in retrospect, all accidents are foreseeable, this is not
sufficient to enlarge the township's duty. It is, of course, both
foreseeable and commonplace that cars will occasionally run into
ditches. The instant case, however, is not the type of accident one
would expect to occur under normal driving circumstances.
Id. at 574.
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Before the trial court and again before this Court, the Trujillos have
provided no meaningful argument to support its claim that Ball, Ball & Brosamer
owed the Trujillos a duty. In fact, before the trial court, the Trujillos sole
response to this entire contention was to note that in Klein v. City of Seattle, 705
P.2d 806 (Wash.Ct.App. 1985), the intoxicated driver was traveling at over
twice the speed limit, whereas here, Mr. Griffin was traveling within the posted
speed limit.
Ball, Ball & Brosamer certainly agrees that each case involving a drunken
driver is distinguishable. The only predictable thing which can be said about
intoxicated motorists is that their actions are unpredictable. There are few
consistent patterns to the time, place, and manner in which they injure other
motorists, which supports Ball, Ball & Brosamer's contention that to impose a
burden requiring it and UDOT to protect other motorists from a drunken driver's
negligence or respond in damages is a duty realistically incapable of
performance.
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While this accident was indeed tragic, it was not the result of any defect on
the roadway. The road itself was easily negotiable by all motorists exercising
reasonable care. The accident was caused by the reckless driving of an
intoxicated driver over whom neither UDOT nor Ball, Ball & Brosamer had any
control. To require these entities to do more than provide a roadway reasonably
safe for travel would impose a duty which simply cannot be fulfilled.
II.
BALL, BALL & BROSAMER CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE
BECAUSE IT FOLLOWED THE PLANS AND
SPECIFICATIONS PROVIDED BY UDOT.
The Trujillos divide their argument with respect to the plans and
specifications into two sections. The first deals with whether Ball, Ball &
Brosamer shares in the State of Utah's tort immunity because it adhered to the
plans and specifications supplied by UDOT. This argument is based on a remark
to this effect in the trial court's bench ruling. R. 1182. However, the Order of
the trial court provided as its basis as follows:
2. Furthermore, the Court also finds that 3B's, as contractor, in
carrying out the plans and specifications for 1-84 drafted by UDOT,
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acted in accordance with the plans and specifications which were not
so unreasonably dangerous that a reasonable contractor would not
perform and carry out said plans and specifications.
R. 1034-35.
Although there is support for the trial court's statement from the bench,
Pratt v. Hercules, Inc., 570 F.Supp. 773 (D.Utah 1982); Vanchieri v. New
Jersey Sports and Exposition Auth., 514 A.2d 1323, 1326 (N.J. 1986); Simons v.
Tri-State Constr. Co., 655 P.2d 703 (Wash. 1983), we focus our arguments on
the trial court's Order, since it is the Order which is being appealed. Moreover,
as set forth below, the public policy arguments supporting both the Order and the
oral statement are similar and are discussed interchangeably.
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the rule holding that a contractor
who follows plans and specifications which are not obviously dangerous is not
subject to liability for defects in the plans. Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah
1972); Leininger v. Stearns-Roger Manufacturing Co, 404 P.2d 33, 37 (Utah
1965). For example, in Leininger, the Utah Supreme Court held as follows:
One important limitation recognized in several cases is that the
contractor is not liable if he has merely carried out carefully the
38

plans, specifications, and directions given him since in that case the
responsibility is assumed by the employer, at least where the plans
are not so obviously dangerous that no reasonable man would follow
them.
Leininger, 404 P.2d at 37.
An excellent illustration of this principle is found mAndrus v. State, 541
P.2d 1117 (Utah 1972). There, a road was designed without proper drainage,
which resulted in flooding on the plaintiffs property. In dismissing the
contractor, Gibbons & Reed, the Court held:
Gibbons & Reed having performed its contract with the State in
accordance with the plans, specifications, and directions given it by
the State with a reasonable degree of skill, we find no basis upon
which to find that the contractor was liable to the plaintiffs.
A*, at 1121.
This rule has particular application when the contractor performs work for
a governmental entity which provides the plans and specifications. For example,
in Pratt v. Hercules, Inc., 570 F.Supp. 773 (D.Utah 1982), the United States
District Court for the District of Utah states as follows:
The question of foreseeability of harm and the possible need to
protect against it arose when the Government framed its terms.
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There is no charge that what the contractor did was not what it was
required to do. Rather, it is that it was negligent in failing to
provide some subsequent safeguard against the subsequent escape of
fumes. Yet, as stated above, this was a decision which rested with
the Government. The Government did not provide for such
additional precautions in the plans, and the Western Contracting
Corp. is not to be held liable for this omission. See Myers v. United
States, 323 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1963); Jemison v. Duplex, 163
F.Supp. 947 (S.D. Ala. 1958). To impose liability on the contractor
under such circumstances would render the Government's immunity
for the consequences of acts in the performance of a "discretionary
function" meaningless, for if the contractor was held liable, contract
prices to the Government would be increased to cover the
contractor's risk of loss from possible harmful effects of complying
with decisions of executive officers authorized to make policy
judgments.
Id. at 804-05. See also, Vanchieri v. New Jersey Sports and Exposition Auth.,
514 A.2d 1323, 1326 (N.J. 1986).
In this case, there is no evidence that Ball, Ball & Brosamer failed to carry
out the plans and specifications provided by UDOT relating to traffic control.
Moreover, there is no evidence or testimony that the plans and specifications
were so dangerous that a reasonable contractor would not follow them.7
7

The Trujillos rely upon a portion of the record, R. 652-59, and contends that Mr. Alcorn
testified that Ball, Ball & Brosamer should have known the plans and specifications were
unreasonably dangerous. The cited record section is a portion of the Trujillos' memorandum
opposing the motions for summary judgment filed by both defendants. That portion of the
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The Trujillos have divided their argument into three parts: (1) lane
separation; (2) speed, and (3) investigation of accidents. Ball, Ball & Brosamer
will address each of these concerns in turn.
A. LANE SEPARATION
As noted by the Trujillos, the Utah Department of Transportation, like
most other states, has adopted the MUTCD as the model for implementation of
traffic control devices. As set forth in the Statement of Facts, the Trujillos'
expert witness, Thomas Alcorn, acknowledged that concrete barriers are not
required in order to separate two-way, two-lane operations under all
circumstances. Rather, the design engineer must make a judgment based on
several factors as to whether barriers would be appropriate. R 2288.
Mr. Alcorn concluded that the use of barrels was appropriate through
much of the project, but that barriers should have been installed between

record contains no reference to the plans being unreasonably dangerous. In fact, neither the word
"unreasonably" nor "dangerous" appear in that portion of the record, either together or
individually.
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mileposts 107 and 109 because of a high accident rate prior to inception of the
project. R. 2282.
Mr. Alcorn's opinion that the plans and specifications were defective is
based not solely on a review of the plans. Indeed, he believes that the plans and
specifications using barrels to separate traffic is appropriate through certain areas
of the project. Rather, his opinion that barrier should have been used between
mileposts 107 and 109 is based on a review of the accidents occurring in that
area prior to construction.
There is no evidence that Ball, Ball & Brosamer had access to the accident
information utilized by Mr. Alcorn in reaching his conclusion prior to the
initiation of the project, nor that it had any duty to obtain that accident
information prior to beginning work. Rather, it was entitled to rely on the plans
and specification as provided by UDOT, and not even Mr. Alcorn feels
competent to render an opinion that the plans and specifications upon which Ball,
Ball & Brosamer relied were so obviously dangerous that no reasonable
contractor would have relied upon them. In fact, no expert witness has ever
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rendered an opinion that the plans and specifications were so obviously dangerous
that no reasonable contractor would rely upon them.
The Trujillos rely upon the letter of Shanker Narayanan dated March 25,
1995, to Larry Durrant. As set forth in the Statement of Facts, Mr. Narayanan
was concerned about the spacing of the barrels and the risk of cross-over
accidents due to inadequate delineation of the lanes. The Trujillos have presented
no evidence that the spacing of the barrels at 100 foot intervals was a proximate
cause of this accident, nor have they presented evidence that Mr. Narayanan did
or would have recommended the use of barriers to remedy the problem
identified.
Indeed, Mr. Narayanan testified that he felt that the use of barrier would
increase the risk of rear-end collisions and would impede the ability to move
rescue personnel to the scene. R. 1767-1770. When asked if he thought it was
more safe to use barriers or barrels, Mr. Narayanan was unsure which was more
safe:
Q.

Do you know whether it is more safe to use concrete
barriers or barrels in the situation you had at 1-84?
43

A.
Q.
A.
Q.

(No response.)
Do you know one way or the other?
No. I mean, it's a hard one to answer.
There are pros and cons?

A.

Pros and cons on both.

R. 1772. (Deposition of Shanker Narayanan, p. 108, attached as Exhibit "3").
Interestingly, even the Trujillos' expert, Thomas Alcorn, would agree that
the use of barrels throughout much of the project was appropriate. Mr. Alcorn's
sole criticism was that barrier was not used at selected locations with high
accident rates, and as set forth above, there is no evidence that Mr. Narayanan
was aware of these accident rates or that he had any reason to know that the use
of barrels in those locations was anything but appropriate.
As set forth in the Trujillos' Statement of Facts, Mr. Narayanan testified
that he discussed the use of barriers and barrels with Larry Durrant, the project
manager for UDOT, but received the impression that barriers could not be used
because it would limit access by emergency vehicles. R. 1696-97. Mr. Durrant
does not recall these conversations. Whether Mr. Narayanan and Mr. Durrant
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discussed the use of barriers is irrelevant to the disposition of Ball, Ball &
Brosamer's motion for summary judgment.
The Trujillos must show that the plans and specifications were so obviously
dangerous that no reasonable contractor would have built the project using barrels
rather than barrier. It is the fact that their own expert witness, Thomas Alcorn,
testified that the use of barrels was suitable through much of the project, and only
became dangerous if one knew of the prior accident rates, which warrants
summary judgment for Ball, Ball & Brosamer. Whether Mr. Durrant and Mr.
Narayanan discussed these issues is irrelevant to the issue upon which the Court
granted summary judgment.
There is no evidence that the plans and specifications were so obviously
dangerous that no reasonable contractor would follow them. The plans were
reviewed by five to twelve engineers within UDOT, by the Federal Highway
Administration, and by eight contractors who bid on the project. There is no
evidence that anyone from any source advocated or recommended the use of
barriers as opposed to barrels prior to this accident. In fact, the Trujillos have
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presented no evidence from any contractor or other expert witness that the plans
and specifications were so obviously dangerous no reasonable contractor would
follow them.
B. SPEED
The Trujillos rely upon the testimony of their expert witness, Thomas
Alcorn, with respect to their contention that the speed limit established by UDOT
on this roadway violated federal law. Specifically, Mr. Alcorn testified that
"federal law said if it's two way, two lane, it's 55." (Deposition of Thomas
Alcorn, p. 81). Even assuming Mr. Alcorn is correct,8 the Trujillos have failed to
demonstrate that this failure to reduce the speed limit had anything at all to do
8

Mr. Alcorn has never provided the basis for his contention that federal law mandated a
55 mile per hour speed limit along this roadway. Utah provides that the roadway may be 65
miles per hour "on highways where this speed limit does not impair the ability of the state to
qualify for federal highway funds." UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-46 (1993). 23 U.S.C. § 154
(which has since be repealed) provided that "the Secretary of Transportation shall not approve
any project under section 106 which has . . . (2) a maximum speed limit on any highway within
its jurisdiction on the Interstate System located outside of an urbanized area of 50,000 population
or more in excess of 65 miles per hour." Interstate-84 qualifies for federal funds with a speed
limit of 65 miles per hour. Although Mr. Alcorn attempts to render a legal opinion as to the
availability of funds for Utah if the speed limit on 1-84 through the construction area is left at 65
miles per hour, he is unable to even provide the statute or regulation he attempts to construe.
Naturally, even if Mr. Alcorn was able to locate the statute upon which he relies, his opinion
would be inadmissible as an impermissible legal conclusion. Durham v. Duchesne County, 893
P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 1995).
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with the accident or their injuries. Mr. Alcorn opined that he would have
reduced the regulatory speed limit from 65 miles per hour to 55 miles per hour:
Q

A.

In your opinion, what would have been the proper-so are you
saying that 55 miles an hour should have been the proper
mandatory speed?
I would say overall, looking at the project, the posted
regulatory speed limit should have been reduced to 55, max.

(Deposition of Thomas Alcorn, pp. 88-9, attached as Exhibit "1").
As set forth in the Statement of Facts, Mr. Trujillo testified that he was
driving about 45-50 miles per hour at the time of the accident, well within the
suggested speed proposed by Mr. Alcorn. R. 581. (Deposition of Alan Trujillo,
p. 43, attached as Exhibit "7"). Trooper Michael Loveland, who investigated the
accident for the Utah Highway Patrol, testified that Mr. Griffin was traveling at
58 miles per hour at the time of the accident. R. 583. Based on this information,
Mr. Alcorn was unable to conclude that speed was a cause of the accident. R.
2269.
Proximate cause if defined as "that cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, (unbroken by an efficient intervening cause,) produces the injury and
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without which the result would not have occurred." Mitchell v. Pearson Enter.,
697 P.2d 240, 245 (Utah 1985). There is absolutely no evidence in the record
that had Mr. Griffin been traveling 55 miles per hour as recommended by Mr.
Alcorn instead of 58 miles per hour, the accident would not have occurred.
There is simply no basis concluding that speed was a factor in this accident
and, thus, there are no grounds under which UDOT and Ball, Ball & Brosamer
could be held liable, even if maintaining the speed limit at 65 miles per hour was
negligent. More importantly for this discussion, there is no testimony from any
witness, expert or otherwise, that the plans and specifications with the 65 mile
per hour speed limit maintained were so unreasonably dangerous that no
reasonable contractor would have performed the work.
C. INVESTIGATION OF ACCIDENTS.
The Trujillos' speculate that had UDOT and Ball, Ball & Brosamer tracked
accidents within the construction zone, they would have discovered the Linda
Thomas accident which occurred some six weeks prior to the accident and
installed barriers to prevent cross-over collisions. Even assuming that Ball, Ball
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& Brosamer, as a contractor, had a legal duty to monitor accidents occurring
through the construction zone, there is no evidence that UDOT would have
installed barrier through the construction zone.
Both Mont Smith, the Safety Risk Manager for Region I, and Bruce
Swenson, the design supervisor, have testified that absent "horrendous statistics,"
UDOT would not have used barrier through the construction site. R. 2168-69,
1921. There is no evidence from any source that had Ball, Ball & Brosamer
learned of the accident involving Linda Thomas, it would have recommended the
use of barriers or that UDOT would have adopted that recommendation.
In sum, there is no evidence from any witness, including the Trujillos' own
expert witness, that the plans and specifications were so unreasonably dangerous
that no reasonable contractor would follow them. In fact, Mr. Alcorn believed
the use of barrels to be quite appropriate throughout much of the project. Mr.
Alcorn has never stated that simply by reviewing the plans, it was apparent that
the plans were defective. Rather, he contends that UDOT failed to consider all
the relevant factors before using barrels at high accident locations. There is no
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evidence from any source that Ball, Ball & Brosamer participated in the design
process, nor is there evidence from any competent witness that a contractor
possessing only the plans could have concluded the plans were defective. Thus,
the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Ball, Ball & Brosamer.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Ball, Ball & Brosamer respectfully requests that
the summary judgment entered by the trial court be affirmed.
DATED MsM day of June, 1998.
MORGAN, MEYER & RICE

Stephen G. Morgan
Joseph E. Minnock
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent
Ball, Ball & Brosamer
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A*

Okay, it would not be my opinion that the

2 J barrels would be below the national standard in much of the
3

project, with the speed limit reduced, posted regulatory

4 I speed limit reduced and warnings for substandard sections for
5 I that speed.
6

Q.

So barrels would not be a violation of the

7

national standard, correct?

8

MR. FERGUSON:

9

Q.

10

that.

In certain areas, he said.

(By Mr. Williams)

And I was going to go on to

You're saying that they in and of themselves would not

11 I be a violation of national standard in a two-way, two-lane
12 J operation, and then you qualified that by saying in certain
13 J areas, and I believe you also said with reduction of the
14 J regulatory speed limit?
15 I

A.

That's correct.

16

Q.

And what other qualifiers did you have on that?

17 J

A.

Well, you can't use channelizing devices by

18

themselves.

They have to be used in combination with the

19

pavement striping to meet the directive if you're going to

20

consider it as a separation device.

21

Q.

In combination with pavement striping?

22

A.

Sure.

23 I

Q.

On both sides?

24 I

A.

That's correct.

25 I

Q.

And that was done here, wasn't it?

You have to mark the center.

I
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1 I

A.

The pictures show it was, yes.

2 1

Q.

If the speed limit had been reduced, and here

3 I again you're talking about regulatory speed limit, correct?
4 I

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

To 50 miles an hour, are you saying 50 or 55?

6 1

A.

I would think that the state would probably do

Q.

If it had been reduced to 55, and they had

7
8 I

it 55.

9 J utilized barrels with striping, would that have, in your
10 J mind, comported with the national standard for construction
11 J zone safety?
12

A.

To start off with, in a generic situation, that

13

would be the minimum standard to comply with the manual, and

14

that is through a project that didn't have other features.

15

Q.

And talking about this specific project, is

16 J there anything else that they would have needed besides the
17

55-mile-an-hour regulatory speed limit and the barrels with

18 J the proper striping on both sides?
19

A.

Well, certainly they have to take into

20 J consideration their geometries here.
21

concern about horizontal curvature.

There's a tremendous
There's some substandard

22 I sections in curvature that meets, even if it meets minimum
23

AASHTO criteria, and you also have extremely high accident

24 J rates in the section that we are talking about.
25 J

Q.

What were the high accident rates that you're
89
SUSAN HELLBERG-YOUNG, CSR, RPR

1 I either federal or state code?
2

A.

Yes.

3 J

Q.

And off the top of your head, you don't know

A.

No.

4 I those?
5

I usually tie just to the federal

6 J regulations and the states about those to get federal aid.
7 J

Q.

Number three, UDOT failed to provide positive

8 J barrier through sections with overrepresented accident rates
9 J to prevent head-on collisions.

Have you already stated your

10 I opinion in connection with that?
11 I

A.

Yes.

I just want to make clear that I'm not

12 I saying that you need barrier from one end of this project to
13 I the other, that there are sections that should have been
14 I looked at with high accident rates that need barrier.
15 I

Q.

Any other sections besides 107 through 109?

16 J

A.

Not from the data that I have.

17 J there was —

One section,

you have two other horizontal curves that have a

18 J problem, and I didn't convert those to mileposts, so I can't
19 I tell you exactly where they are at.
20

Q.

Okay, when you say horizontal curve, you're

21 I talking about winding side to side?
22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Vertical would be hills?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

I always have to think in terms of my vertical
97
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1 I what before they start making decisions about what they are
2 J going to put in?
3 I

A.

They should take into consideration not only

4 I that this is a two-lane, two-way operation on a roadway, but
5 I it's a two-lane, two-way roadway operation on this particular
6 I section of roadway that has problems in certain areas.
7

Q.

You're saying that UDOT didn't do that?

8 1

A.

I'm saying they did not do that.

9 I

Q.

What else didn't they take into consideration?

10 J

A.

On page 182 with the diagram TA-39, it

11 J basically tells anyone using it on long-term projects on high
12 I speed highways, consideration should be given to the use of
13 J barriers as a separation device.
14 J

Q.

Is it your opinion that no consideration to

15 J those factors was given?
16 I

A.

I haven't seen any consideration in the

17 J information I have for barriers as a separation device.
18 I
19

Q.

That doesn't mandate that barriers are used in

order to comply with the MUTCD, does it?

20 J

A.

This does not mandate it, no.

21

Q.

In other words, it's left up to the discretion

I

22 I of the designer and the other officials who are actually
23 J designing the project?
24

J

A.

Taking into consideration the other

25 I requirements in the manual, traffic engineering study be
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II

Q.

Are you utilizing that experience for the

2 I purpose of expressing any opinions that you've expressed
3

today?

4 I

A.

No.

5 I

Q.

Calling your attention to Exhibit 72, you were

6 I asked to during a break write down your opinions that you
7 I were going to express in this case; is that correct?
8 I

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

And you had about how long to write down those

10 J opinions during the break?
11 J

A.

I believe I took 10 or 15 minutes.

12 J

Q.

And having written down those opinions, then

13 I you were asked questions with regards to them once the
14 J deposition commenced; is that correct?
15 J

A.

Yes, sir.

16 I

Q.

When you first wrote down your opinions on

17 J Exhibit 72, before you were asked a question, am I correct
18 J that on opinion number four, the slash and Three Bees was not
19

there when you first wrote it down?

20 I

A.

You're correct.

21

Q.

Once you were asked questions, when you were

22 J reading number four, your counsel turned over to you and
23 I briefly conversed with you, and you added Three Bees; is that
24 I correct?
25

A.

That's correct.
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1 I

Q.

Mr. Narayanan?

2 I

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

What is it that you can recall that you're

4 J relying upon?
5

A.

6

I remember him saying he was also concerned

about vehicles hitting the barrels.

It was difficult to keep

7 I the barrels in place because of the number of hits, and that
8 I the barrels themselves create problems because they are not
9 I in the appropriate place.
10 I

Q.

Anything else?

11 J

A.

I don't recall anything.

12 J

Q.

So outside of the letter and what you just

13 I testified to, you are not aware of anything other than items
14 I that Mr. Narayanan or Three Bees were concerned about?
15 J

MR. FERGUSON:

Objection, misstates his answer,

16 I he said those are the things that he could recall at this
17 I time from Mr. Narayanan's deposition, not that he was aware
18

of.

19
20

THE WITNESS:
J

Q.

That's all I recall.

(By Mr. Morgan)

In your opinion, do concrete

21 J barriers constitute a hazard in and of themselves?
22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

why is that?

A.

They are rigid objects.

24

J

The criteria for the

25 I use of the barrier is very clear, you only use a barrier when
113
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the hazard of hitting the barrier is less than the hazard of
hitting the object that the barrier is protecting.
Q.

Do you have an opinion with regards to

—

strike that.
Are you familiar with the term comfort zone in
traveling next to concrete barriers?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What does that mean, in your opinion?

A.

It simply says that there's a distance close to

the barrier that people do not like to be, and we know by our
capacity analysis that we can reduce the capacity facility if
we are too close to the barriers.

People are not comfortable

being right up against them.
Q.

Why is that?

A.

They are difficult to discern as far as their

location.

They are not real obvious, they are not typically

delineated well.

People just don't like to drive that close

to something as rigid and solid as a barrier is.
Q.

Have there been any studies made how far they

tend to shy away from the barriers in terms of feet?
A.

I believe that we —

yes, there are.

statistics on where people will drive.

There are

I don't recall what

they are.
Q.

Do you have any general knowledge in that

regard at all?
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early on in the project.
Why did Jim want to use barrels?
What did he say to you that
led you to believe that he wanted to use
barrels instead of barriers?
Well, we prior to that had used lane separation
things as minimal as just a double yellow line.
You know.

I see things up in Idaho that are

far less than what we use.
We had to go to at least
something that was AASHTO approved, something
that was acceptable as far as the feds were
concerned.

Some of the things that you do on a

project, you want to make very sure that you
have federal concurrence.
That's why we have plan in
hand reviews.

That's why we have PS & E

reviews, so that those things aren't decided by
just one person.

They're decided by a team of

individuals.
Why did Jim want to use barrels instead of
barriers?
Probably several reasons.
Can you tell me?
Cost would be one.

Barrier is a dangerous

acceptable by the feds for this traffic plan,
right?
They could have been, yes.
Any other reasons to your knowledge why Jim
Thompson didn't use barriers instead of
barrels?
Well, yes.
What other reason?
I remember talking about emergency vehicles.
You can't just leap a barrier with emergency
vehicles.

If you do have to chase them around,

you have to chase them clear up and around an
interchange.
Any other reasons you can recall that Jim
Thompson considered?
It wasn't just Jim Thompson.

These were

Swenson and Jim Thompson.
That's fine.

Any other reasons why you chose

barrels instead of barriers?
Not that I can recall right now.
Can you show me anything in writing that you
had at the time that would tell you how much
portable concrete barriers would have cost for
traffic separation versus what barrels would
have cost?

object in and of itself.

It has a tendency to

roll small vehicles particularly.
Jim was just as astute as
anyone about watching out for the little guy,
you might say.

Because the little haunch that

comes up on those barriers, they're called a
Jersey barrier, and a small vehicle gets up on
them and, poof, it's right over on its top.
We use the barrels in lieu of
just a double yellow line.
wasn't acceptable.

Double yellow line

We had thought about a

little raised curb, but at that speed a little
raised curb is a little -- it doesn't really do
a heck of a lot for you.

That has a tendency

to roll vehicles as well.
We thought about candlesticks.
That isn't an acceptable.
vertical panels.

We almost went to

We had used vertical panels

in a lot of instances, and they're not -- all
of those things that I mentioned aren't
acceptable means to separate traffic.
The barrels are what the feds
figure are an acceptable barrier -- acceptable
traffic separation.
Barriers were also an acceptable traffic --

1

barrier or barrel placement, any conversations

2

dealing with them.

3

Q.

The first sentence in Deposition Exhibit 3

4

states, this letter is to reiterate our

5

concerns with regard to UDOT's less than

6

adequate traffic control design for this

7

proj ect.

8

In your opinion was this

9

traffic control design for this project less

10

than adequate?

Or was it adequate?

11

A.

I think it was adequate.

12

Q.

In terms of the kind of review that this

13

traffic control design for this project went

14

through, could you just reiterate for me

15

starting with how the project plan is initiated

16

what it goes through and what people pass or

17

approve this project plan?

18

MR. WILLIAMS:

Are you

19

limiting this to within UDOT or outside UDOT,

20

including federal people?

21

MR. MORGAN:

Both.

22

THE WITNESS:- To begin with,

23

we go through a scoping review in which we just

24

have -- we kind of outline the types of things

25

we're going to do on the project.

That's with
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1

just -- it can be with as little of a plan as,

2

say, the original construction plan that was

3

completed 30 years ago.

4

We just kind of demonstrate at

5

that time what the project parameters are going

6

to be.

7

talk about the paving that we want to do on the

8

project.

9

going to handle traffic on the project.

Beginning project, end project.

We

We talk about how we think we're

10

One of the primary issues on

11

that project was the interchange by Morgan

12

itself, in that we had a sight distance problem

13

on the westbound off ramp at Morgan, and we

14

wanted to change that westbound off ramp

15

location so that people could actually see it

16

as it was coming up.

17

There were drainage issues

18

that the maintenance guy brought up.

19

the minutes.

20

have a scoping --

21

Q.

That's in

But the process requires you to

Let me just interrupt you for a minute.

22

Starting with the scoping, and you use the word

23

we.

24

engineers?

25

A.

Yes.

Can you just tell me if we includes

On each one of these levels?
Yes.
Just indicate the nature of the engineers
involved.
We'd have somebody from the division of safety,
would be a safety engineer specifically.

We

would have a lot more people invited than
sometimes attend.
But that usually includes as
well a materials engineer, a geotechnical
engineer if we have a project that had a
geotechnical problem, a structural engineer, a
construction engineer, both from a local level
construction as well as central office.

The

central office is the deputy construction
engineers.
After we've had that
meeting -The scoping meeting?
The scoping.

We go to a -- we put our set of

plans together, and that plan at that time for
a plan in hand review doesn't include the
quantities.

It includes everything but

quantities, and, as plans are laid out,
quantities are always found in sheet number

10b
1 I

three.

2 I

This particular generation of

3

plan you see over here is the plan in hand

4

copy.

5

we're just looking for things on the project

6

without addressing any of the project costs.

7

We have an approximation of

It has no quantity sheets in it.

So,

8

project costs at that time, but that's all it

9

is is an approximation.

10

Q.

Those involved in the plan in hand meeting?

11

A.

Are those same folks I just described.

Always

12

someone from division of safety, structures,

13

because we had structure rehab work,

14

construction, looking for constructability of

15

the project, the maintenance guys.

16

There are usually on any

17

project about anywhere from five to around a

18

dozen engineers in those meetings.

19

Q.

20
21

So, what happens after the plan in hand
meeting?

A.

Then we address the comment to the plan in hand

22

and calculate quantities for the project.

23

After we've done that we have --

24

Q.

We, is that the same folks?

25

A.

That's the same folks.

w*
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Q.

Which include the five to 12 engineers?

A.

Yes.

3 I Q.

All right.

4

Have another meeting called a PS & E meeting,

A.

5

which includes plans, special provisions, and

6

estimate, where we sit around a table in a

7

conference room and beat up each page in the

8

plan.

9

well as the special provisions page by page.

10

We go through the plan page by page as

And the estimate page by page.

11

Q.

Does that include the same folks?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

The five to 12 engineers?

14

A.

Yes.

Like I say it -- the thing about that is

15

the representation from safety particularly is

16

usually a hundred percent.

17

meeting where at least the central folks from

18

safety aren't there.

I've not had a

19

Q.

How many people does that include from safety?

20

A.

At least one.

21

Q.

That's a safety engineer?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Then, what's his name?

24

A.

It varies from meeting to meeting.

25

vary.

It may
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Q.

What after the PS & E review?

A.

After the PS & E review we have what's called a

3 I

final review in which there's only two sets of

4

plans distributed at that time.

5

the division of safety.

6

engineer.

One goes to

One goes to project

7

Q.

What does the final review consist of?

8

A.

Just them assuring that the project engineer,

9

who has to build the project, has everything he

10

wants in the plan and division of safety given

11

their concurrence for the traffic control plans

12

particularly and the deciding which elevation

13

for the project.

14

Q.

The final review, who attends that meeting?

15

A.

It's not an attended meeting.

It's the only

16

one that's not attended.

It's a distribution

17

and you have X days to give comment.

18

Q.

Who can give comment?

19

A.

The project engineer, and division of safety.

20

Q.

Were there comments in this project?

21

A.

From those two at that time?

22

Q.

Then, what happens after the final review and

23
24
25

I don't think so.

distribution of those two sets of plans?
A.

After any comment or no response, then
advertising.

Q.

So, you had barrels plus two feet?

A.

Plus two feet, yes.

Q.

What you were describing in your answer was a
comfort level that drivers have when they were
going up against a concrete barrier immediately
next to them?

A.

Well, yeah.

Of course, it works the same with

both features.

You still have that tendency to

shy, whether it's barrier or barrels.
Q.

I think you previously testified, did you not,
with regards to why you felt 100-foot was
adequate as opposed to anything less --

A.

Yes.

Q.

-- given the fact that the driver is going 50
to 70 miles per hour, which would be 75 to 105
feet per second.

A.

In this case we set up 50 or 55 mile per hour
even as advisory speeds.

The hundred foot

spacing was accurate.
Q.

Had the contractor suggested in this particular
project that the two-way traffic be separated
with concrete barriers as opposed to barrels or
drums, would UDOT have changed to concrete
barriers throughout the project?

A.

No.
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Smaller than barrels?
Smaller than barrels.
Mr. Ferguson had you identify the benefits of
concrete barriers, and you also talked about one
of the risks as -- I believe is being rear end,
multiple rear-end accidents; is that correct?
Correct.
If you have concrete barriers such as have been
suggested by Mr. Ferguson, if you had those on the
1-84 project, would that cut down the availability
of escape on any side in order to avoid a rear-end
accident for eastbound traffic if there would have
been channeled concrete barriers on both sides?
You cut down -- possibly cut down the access to
the -- for people trying to maneuver out in front,
moving across into the other lane.
So, you cut down any escape routes whatsoever to
either side?
Eastbound?
By eastbound?
Yes.
That creates a risk in and of itself, correct?
That creates a risk, too, yes.
Do you remember discussing that with UDOT at any
time, in weighing the pros and cons of the

108
ends somebody going 60 miles an hour, is that also
an accident where you're going to have serious
injury?
A.

Possible, yes.

Q.

Do you know whether it is more safe to use
concrete barriers or barrels in the situation you
had at 1-84?

A.

(No response.)

Q.

Do you know one way or the other?

A.

No.

Q.

There are pros and cons?

A.

Pros and cons on both.

Q.

Did you have a conversation with Mr. Durrant as to

I mean, it's a hard one to answer.

those pros and cons?
A.

Again, we probably did.

I'm not recalling my

conversation.
Q.

How was it left in terms of what you as the
representative of Three Bees was supposed to do
with regards to the existing circumstances of
barrels?

A.

It was decided basically to do the concrete with
respect to -(Discussion off the record.)

Q.

(By Mr. Morgan):

What was decided as a result of

the conversation you had with Mr. Durrant?
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A.

It would be nothing but a guess.

Q.

What's your guess?
MR. WILLIAMS:

Well, I won't allow you to

speculate, but if you have an educated guess, go ahead.
THE WITNESS:

Four times.

Q.

(By Mr. Ferguson)

And why do you say four

A.

One half the road at one time, so that meant

times?

that traffic had to be shifted to the other side, and that's
once.

You're shifting it back is twice both directions, is

four.
Q.

Did you ever talk to a manufacturer's

representative about the Rolex system and it's being used in
1-84 in that canyon?
A.

No.

Q.

Did you talk with anybody who had used it

before to determine whether or not it would work on 1-84?
A.

No.

Q.

Did anybody ever ask your opinion before this

accident whether or not that Rolex system would work in the
canyon on 1-84?
A.

No.

I never had any conversation with anybody

about it, period.
Q.

What, if anything, would have caused UDOT to

switch from barrels to barriers on 1-84?
97
SUSAN HELLBERG-YOUNG, CSR, RPR

1 I

MR. MINNOCK:

2 J

MR. WILLIAMS:

3 I and overbroad.
4 J

I would object, speculation.
I'll join in that, it's vague

If you feel like you can answer, go ahead.
THE WITNESS:

I don't believe it is obviously a

5 I concern, the safety of the highway condition, the user
6 I interpretation.

I don't believe anything short of horrendous

7 I statistics would have got another look at that.
8 1

Q.

(By Mr. Ferguson)

Is it fair to say that the

9 I accidents that occurred in the two-way, two-lane operation
10 J with the traveling public during the time that construction
11 J went on were within the acceptable risks of injury by UDOT?
12 J

MR. WILLIAMS:

13 J acceptable risks of injury.
14 I

THE WITNESS:

Object to the use of the phrase
Vague and ambiguous.
Are you waiting for an answer?

15 I

Q.

(By Mr. Ferguson)

16 I

A.

I can't answer.

17
18

Yes.
It's wholly speculative to me,

and I don't have a feel for it.
I

Q.

Did you have the authority on your own to

19

require that the barrels be switched to barriers once the

20

construction had started?

21
22

I

A.

No.

Q.

Did you have authority on your own during the

23 I design phase to require that barrels be used rather than
2

4 I barriers?

25

A.

No.
98
SUSAN HELLBERG-YOUNG, CSR, RPR
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1

A.

Yes, we was.

2

Q.

Had you been up and down that road since the

3

1

constructioni started before this?
A.

4

Yes, I have.

1

I can't say how many times.

I

5

have been up and down it so many times since, it's just

6

totally confusing as to when they started it.

7

any idea, but our normal would be at least twice a month, we

J

I don't have

8 1 would be in Ogden.
9

Q.

Now, where were you seated in the vehicle?

1

10

A.

Where was I?

1

11

Q.

Seated.

12

A.

I was the driver.

13

Q.

Where was your wife seated?

14

A.

She was the passenger.

15

Q.

In the passenger seat?

16

A.

Yes, she was.

17

Q.

Do you recall if you both had your seat belts

19

A.

Yes, we did.

20

Q.

Was anyone else in the vehicle?

21

A.

No, there wasn't.

22

Q.

Can you tell me about how fast you were going

18

23

on?

at the time of the accident?

24

A.

25

Q.

45 to 50 miles an hour.
-Do you -know whether there was anybody behind

43
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ALAN TRUJILLO and SHARON
TRUJILLO,

) CIVIL NO. 960907179PI
)
DEPOSITION OF:
j MICHAEL LOVELAND

Plaintiffs,

Held March 3, 1997

vs.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION; BALL,
BALL & BROSAMER, INC., a
California corporation;
and JOHN DOES I through X,
Defendants.

) REPORTED BY:
) RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
)
)
)

^ <T\ \C)j%>7

j

^

^

U

u

Deposition of MICHAEL LOVELAND, taken on behalf
of the Defendants, at the Layton City Courthouse, 425
North Wasatch Drive, Layton, Utah, commencing at 1:30
p.m. on March 3, 1997, before RENEE L. STACY,
Certified Shorthand Reporter, Registered Professional
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of
Utah, pursuant to Notice.
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It was a 100-foot cord.

Middle cord in of

j 3.8, which translates into 58 miles per hour.

3

Q

What's that DF?

4

A

The drag factor of the vehicle.

5

Q

Which —

6

A

6.5.

7

Q

What's the formula for that?

8

plug that in?

9
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How do you

Is there a chart or do you have to

A

There is a chart.

Q

Okay.

—

I don't have it with

me.

11
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is that .65?

But if you plug those three numbers

in, it yi elds 58 miles an hour?
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Yes.
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Q

You indicated a posted speed in that area

15

of 50 mil es an hour.

16

Was that the normal speed or the advisory speed

17

established by a construction site?

What type of posting was that?
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Yes.
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Q

Was that —

20

A

Posted.

Q

You indicated a travel speed for the

21
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so that was the advisory speed?

Both sides of the construction

zone.

23

Trujillos of 50 miles an hour.

24

determined?

25

A

How was that

That was just from talking to the

^ RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1188
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